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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - New York State Club Association v. City of
New York, - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988)
The right of free association, though not specifically enumerated in the
United States Constitution, is a judicially recognized right1 afforded consti-
tutional protection under the first amendment.2 In New York State Club
Association v. City of New York,3 the United States Supreme Court held that
a city law4 prohibiting discrimination by clubs not distinctly private in na-
1. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Although the freedom of
association is not explicitly guaranteed by the first amendment, the importance of an individual's
right to freely associate with others to advance shared beliefs and ideas has long been recognized
by legal scholars and political theorists. As Alexis de Tocqueville noted over 100 years ago:
The most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting for himself, is that of combin-
ing his exertions with those of his fellow creatures and of acting in common with them.
The right of association therefore appears to me almost as inalienable in its nature as the
right of personal liberty. No legislator can attack it without impairing the foundations of
society.
I A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 196 (1945).
2. The first amendment guarantees that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The Supreme Court has noted that "[a]ssociation... is a form of expression of opinion; and
while it is not expressly included in the first amendment its existence is necessary in making the
express guarantees fully meaningful." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965); see also
Note, Roberts v. United States Jaycees: Discriminatory Membership Policy of a National Organiza-
tion Held Not Protected by First Amendment Freedom of Association, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 1055,
1055 n.1 (1985).
Although the Supreme Court recognized the right of free association in NAACP v. Alabama,
one commentator has suggested that the scope of free association remains largely unsettled.
Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1964) ("[T]he
constitutional source of 'the right of association,' the principles which underlie it, [and] the extent
of its reach ... have never been clearly set forth.").
3. - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
4. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986), reprinted in Appellant's Brief at 3, New York
State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1986) (No. 86-1836).
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ture5 was constitutional on its face under the first6 and fourteenth
amendments.7
The Court, in a unanimous decision,' ruled that an amendment to New
York City's ("City") human rights ordinance,9 which prohibited discrimi-
nation in those clubs determined to be public in nature, 10 did not infringe
upon the New York State Club Association's ("N.Y.S.C.A.") first amend-
ment right of free association." The Court acknowledged that some of
N.Y.S.C.A.'s members may have been entitled to constitutional protec-
tion, 12 but it affirmed the court of appeal's enforcement of Local Law 63 13
because the Law did not infringe upon the associational rights of every
N.Y.S.C.A. member.14
This Note begins with a short synopsis of the facts in New York State
Club Association. A review of the development of the right of free associa-
tion, including a discussion of the elements and restrictions on free associa-
tion, will follow. An analysis of the Supreme Court's decision will then be
presented, and this Note will conclude with an assessment of the ruling and
a discussion of the trends that will impact upon the right of free association
in the future.
5. Id. In 1984, New York City amended its Human Rights Law to include Local Law 63,
which extended the:
antidiscrimination provisions of the Human Rights Law to any "institution, club or place
of accommodation [that] has more than four hundred members, provides regular meal
service and regularly receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals
or beverages directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmembers for the furtherance of
trade or business."
New York State Club Ass'n, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2230 (quoting N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-
102(9) (1986)).
6. Id. at 2233-35; see supra note 2.
7. New York State Club Ass'n, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2235-36. The fourteenth amend-
ment provides, in part, that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See generally Goodwin, Challenging the Private Club:
Sex Discrimination Plaintiffs Barred at the Door, 13 Sw. U.L. REV. 237 (1982) (applicability of
equal protection challenge to state action regulating the benefits of an organization).
8. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2229. Justice White delivered the majority opin-
ion. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor and
Kennedy joined. Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Kennedy joined.
Justice Scalia also filed a concurring opinion. Id.
9. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986).
10. See infra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
11. New York State Club Ass'n, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2235.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2231, afl'g 69 N.Y.2d 211, 505 N.E.2d 915, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1987).
14. New York State Club Ass'n, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2235.
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In October 1984, New York City amended its human rights ordinance
to include Local Law 63,15 which altered the definition of a "distinctly pri-
vate" organization.1 6 Local Law 63 was designed to broaden the scope of
the City's public accommodation laws by depriving organizations of the
"distinctly private" exclusion17 if they had more than 400 members, pro-
vided regular meal service, and regularly received payments for services
from non-members. 8 The amendment affected a substantial number of
clubs belonging to N.Y.S.C.A., a consortium of 125 private clubs and as-
sociations in the State of New York.19
N.Y.S.C.A. filed suit against the City in the New York Supreme Court,
New York County,2 ° seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from enforce-
ment of Local Law 63 on the grounds that the amendment was unconstitu-
15. Jurisdictional statement for Appellant at 2, New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New
York, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988) (No. 86-1836). Local Law 63 amended New York
City's public accommodation law to provide, in part, that:
An institution, club or place of accommodation shall not be considered in its nature dis-
tinctly private if it has more than four hundred members, provides regular meal service
and regularly receives payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals or
beverages directly or indirectly from or on behalf of non-members for the furtherance of
trade or business. For the purposes of this section a corporation incorporated under the
benevolent orders law but formed under any other law of this state, or a religious corpora-
tion incorporated under the education law or the religious corporations law shall be
deemed to be in its nature distinctly private.
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986).
16. Jurisdictional statement for Appellant at 3, New York State Club Ass'n, - U.S. at -, 108
S. Ct. at 2225.
17. New York State Club Ass'n, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2230. The Civil Rights Act of
1964 was enacted to prohibit discrimination in "place[s] of public accommodation." Id. at -, 108
S. Ct. at 2229-30. However, clubs that were "distinctly private" in nature were exempt from
compliance with public accommodation laws and were allowed to engage in discriminatory prac-
tices. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2230. Many states, like New York, have amended the public accom-
modation laws to include clubs that are "determined to be sufficiently 'public' in nature that they
do not fit properly within the exemption" for private clubs. Id. Characterizing an organization as
being public in nature enables the state to prohibit those organizations from engaging in discrimi-
natory practices. Id. However, by depriving an organization of its exemption from public accom-
modation laws, the state infringes upon the organization's right of free association. The conflict
between a club's right to freely associate and a state's interest in eradicating discrimination was
before the Supreme Court in New York State Club Ass'n. See also Case Comment, Board of
Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte: Prying Open the Doors of the All-
Male Club, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 117 (1988).
18. New York State Club Ass'n, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2230.
19. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2231; see also supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
20. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, No. 25028/84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y.
County: Special Term, Part 1, Nov. 28, 1985) (unreported decision), affd, 118 A.D.2d 392, 505
N.Y.S.2d 152 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986), afl'd, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 505 N.E.2d 915, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349
(1987), afjid, - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
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tional on its face under the first and fourteenth amendments. 2' The trial
court upheld Local Law 6322 and N.Y.S.C.A. appealed. Both the New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,2 3 and the New York Court of
Appeals upheld the trial court's decision.14 The New York Court of Ap-
peals reasoned that the City's compelling interest in eliminating discrimina-
tion justified any potential infringement of associational rights .2  The
N.Y.S.C.A. appealed the decision.
The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction 6 and af-
firmed the decision.27 The Court rejected N.Y.S.C.A.'s facial challenge,
ruling that Local Law 63 did not infringe upon the intimate and expressive
associational rights of all of N.Y.S.C.A.'s members.2 8
II. FIRST AMENDMENT - FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: BACKGROUND,
ELEMENTS, AND RESTRICTIONS
A. Background
Freedom of association is the fundamental right to associate with others
for the purpose of advancing commonly held beliefs and ideas.29 Although
the right of free association is not expressly guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion,3° the Supreme Court has ruled that free association is an independent
21. New York State Club Ass'n, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2231.
22. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, No. 25028/84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y.
County: Special Term, Part 1, Nov. 28, 1985) (unreported decision).
23. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 118 A.D.2d 392, 505 N.Y.S.2d 152
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986), afid, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 505 N.E.2d 915, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1987), afid, 108
S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
24. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 505 N.E.2d 915, 513
N.Y.S.2d 349 (1987), afid, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
25. 69 N.Y.2d at 223, 505 N.E.2d at 921, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
26. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 62 (1987).
27. New York State Club Ass'n, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2231.
28. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2234-35.
29. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). The Supreme Court,
since 1958, has consistently noted the existence of a right of free association. See, e.g., Tashjian v.
Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1986); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609 (1984); Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107
(1981); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
30. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482. "The association of people is not mentioned in the
Constitution nor in the Bill of Rights." Id.
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right31 derived from the first amendment guarantees of free speech, peacea-
ble assembly, and freedom of religion.32
Recognition by the Supreme Court of the freedom of association 3 has
also necessitated recognition of the freedom to associate exclusively.34 Jus-
tice Douglas has argued that the right of exclusive association permits dis-
crimination in private groups since "[t]he associational rights which our
system honors permit all white, all black, all brown and all yellow clubs to
31. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 460. It has been suggested that the" 'freedom of asso-
ciation' has been little more than a shorthand phrase used by the Court to protect traditional first
amendment rights of speech and petition as exercised by individuals in groups." Raggi, An In-
dependent Right to Freedom of Association, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 1 (1977).
Since the Supreme Court's recognition of the right of free association in 1958, the Court has
expanded free association to encompass a broad spectrum of first amendment activities. See, eg.,
Tashjian, 479 U.S. 208 (closed primary statute interfered with a political party's first amendment
right to define its associational boundaries); Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984)
(right of free association did not extend to a law firm practicing gender-based discrimination in
partnership selection); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982) (agreements to engage in illegal
conduct have elements of associational conduct, but are not afforded constitutional protection
under the right of free association); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (state statute requir-
ing demonstration by marriage applicants supporting minor children, of compliance with support
obligation violated the applicants' free associational rights); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977) (zoning ordinance prohibiting any non-family members from residing in a house-
hold violated residents' right of free association by regulating the persons designated as family);
Runyon, 427 U.S. 160 (civil rights statutes did not infringe upon the associational rights of a
private school attempting to deny admission on the basis of race); Healy, 408 U.S. 169 (universi-
ties are not exempt from abiding by the first amendment right of free association); Griswold, 381
U.S. at 482-83 (state law prohibiting use of contraceptives invaded marital privacy and violated
penumbral right of free association); Button, 371 U.S. 415 (group's activities were expressional in
nature and were therefore protected by the right of free association as guaranteed under the first
and fourteenth amendments); Shelton, 364 U.S. 479 (statute compelling teachers hired on a yearly
basis to submit affidavits listing all organizations to which they belonged or contributed in prior
five years violated the teachers' right of free association); cf. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1, 14 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall noted that "[i]t is inconceivable to
me that we would allow the exercise of zoning power to burden First Amendment freedoms, as by
ordinances that restrict occupancy to individuals adhering to particular religious, political, or
scientific beliefs." Id.
32. See supra note 2.
33. See supra notes 1 and 29.
34. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see
also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313
(1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (Justice Goldberg noted that "[p]rejudice and bigotry in any
form are regrettable, but it is the constitutional right of every person to close his home or club to
any person."); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-23, at 700-01 (1978); Note,
supra note 2, at 1066 ("[T]he constitutional right to associate necessarily suggests a parallel right
to be free from association.").
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be formed .... Government may not tell a man or woman who his or her
associates must be. The individual can be as selective as he desires.""5
The freedom of association, however, is not an absolute right.36
Although the Constitution protects against "unjustified governmental inter-
ference" with an individual's exclusive associations, 7 this protection may
be infringed upon if a state has a compelling interest in restricting the asso-
ciational rights of a group.3"
B. Elements of the Right of Free Association: Intimate Association and
Expressive Association
As a means of balancing free association and compelling state interests,
the Supreme Court has recognized the existence of two distinct elements of
free association. 9 Finding both "intrinsic and instrumental features of con-
stitutionally protected association,"' the Court has recognized the freedom
of intimate association41 and the freedom of expressive association.42
35. Moose Lodge No. 107, 407 U.S. at 179-80 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In Moose
Lodge No. 107, the Supreme Court recognized the constitutionality of discrimination by individu-
als in private organizations. Id. at 171-72 (majority opinion).
Currently, the Court appears to have narrowed the scope of free association in an effort to
eradicate discrimination in clubs found not to be distinctly private in nature. See, e.g., Board of
Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (application of state
antidiscrimination law to local chapters of a nonprofit corporation did not infringe upon the mem-
bers' right of free association); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (local chap-
ters of a service organization were not distinctly private in nature and could not exclude women
from regular membership on the basis of free association). See generally Bums, The Exclusion of
Women From Influential Men's Clubs: The Inner Sanctum and the Myth of Full Equality, 18
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 321 (1983) (an analysis of discrimination in private men's clubs and an
assessment of the impact of freedom of association on the future of those clubs).
36. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. The Supreme Court ruled that the application of a
state antidiscrimination law to local chapters of the Jaycees did not violate the organization's
freedom of association when balanced against the compelling interest of the state in eliminating
gender-based discrimination. Id. at 626.
37. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. at 544; see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619 ("Protecting
these relationships from unwarranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability indepen-
dently to define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty.").
38. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
39. See Note, Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte: Redefining Asso-
ciational Rights, 1988 B.Y.U. L. REV. 141, 142.
40. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
41. Id. The Supreme Court has recognized that the right of intimate association and the right
of privacy are penumbral rights guaranteed by the first amendment. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.
Thus, intimate association is regarded as existing within a "zone of privacy" arising from the
rights guaranteed in the first amendment. Id. at 484. The Court noted that a "zone of privacy"
extends:
"to all invasions on the part of the government and its employes of the sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of
his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence [sic]; but it is the invasion of his
[Vol. 72:495
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Intimate association is a facet of personal liberty that is guaranteed by
the Bill of Rights.4 3 The Supreme Court recognized that the ability to form
highly personal relationships without unwarranted state intervention was
crucial to the development of "one's identity that is central to any concept
of liberty."'  Thus, intimate associations are afforded constitutional protec-
tion."5 Those intimate relationships typically granted constitutional protec-
tion46 include marriage,47 childbirth," rearing and educating children,49
and cohabitation with relatives.50
Expressive association is derived from the first amendment guarantees
of free speech and peaceable assembly."1 The Supreme Court has noted
that the freedom to associate with others "in pursuit of a wide variety of
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that
right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense... any forcible and
compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony... of crime ... is within the condemna-
tion of that judgment. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into
each other."
Id. at 484 n.* (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). Therefore, the right of
intimate association has its foundations not only in the first amendment, but also in the fourth,
fifth, and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 485.
42. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618. The right of expressive association is an extension of those
activities guaranteed by the first amendment. Expressive association, unlike intimate association,
is not contained in a zone of privacy. Rather, the right of expressive association is based on the
rights enumerated in the first amendment. Id. at 622; see also Bums, supra note 35.
43. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-19. The Supreme Court noted that:
[Choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured
against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguard-
ing the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this respect,
freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty.
Id. at 617-18.
44. Id. at 619.
45. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. at 545; see also Note, Roberts v. United States Jaycees:
Does the Right of Free Association Imply an Absolute Right of Private Discrimination?, 1986 UTAH
L. REV. 373, 375-76.
46. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-20. The Supreme Court noted that factors such as "size,
purpose, policies, selectivity, congeniality, and other characteristics" are relevant to a determina-
tion that an organization is intimate in nature. Id. at 620.
47. See, e.g., Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 374 (state statute requiring residents who were responsible
for support of a minor child to seek court approval prior to marriage was held to be
unconstitutional).
48. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479 (state statute forbidding the sale of contraceptives
violated the rights of marital property and free association).
49. See, eg., Runyon, 427 U.S. at 160 (civil rights statutes did not infringe upon the freedom
of association of a private school attempting to deny admission to students on the basis of race).
50. See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. at 494 (zoning ordinance prohibiting any non-family members
from residing in a household violated residents' right of free association by regulating the persons
designated as family).




political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends" 2 in-
sures the constitutional protection of those rights enumerated in the first
amendment.53 Therefore, constitutional protection is extended to those or-
ganizations engaging in expressive activity.54 However, the right of expres-
sive association is not absolute. 5   An expressive organization's right to
associate exclusively may be infringed upon by a state that is advancing a
compelling interest.56
C. Restrictions on the Right of Free Association: Compelling State
Interest and the Least-Restrictive Means Test
The Supreme Court has held that infringements upon the right of free
association may be "justified. . . to serve compelling state interests ... that
cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive."57 The ex-
tent of a state's infringement upon an individual's freedom of association
will be determined through a balancing test.5 8 The Court has ruled that
only those state interests which are compelling in nature will outweigh the
In oral argument in Roberts, the Justices used two examples to illuminate their understand-
ing of an unconstitutional infringement on the right of expressive association. The first
example was an Iranian society devoted to Iranian interests, whose primary position was
anti-Iraq. When the Court asked counsel for Roberts whether or not that club could be
forced to admit Iraqis, counsel responded that they could not constitutionally be forced to
do so, because in that situation being an Iraqi would to a great extent determine your point
of view on the Iranian club's position, and so admitting Iraqis would interfere with the
expressive rights of the Iranians.
Case Comment, supra note 17, at 138 n.4 (citations omitted) (quoting Proceedings at 7, Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984)).
52. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
53. Id. Recognition of the right of expressive association was relatively unambiguous. How-
ever, attempts to define an expressive organization have not been so clear. Justice Douglas con-
tended that just "[j]oining is one method of expression." Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 882
(1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Other commentators have disagreed with Douglas' argument,
noting that:
Almost everything we do is expressive in one way or another, and thus to say that the First
Amendment is a generalized presumptive guarantee of the liberty to do anything that has
expressive aspects would be much like saying that the constitutional right of privacy guar-
antees "the right to be let alone." The First Amendment would, in short, be stretched to
cover all our constitutional freedoms.
Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 654 (1980).
54. See Case Comment, supra note 17.
55. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623. The Supreme Court recognized that the "[f]reedom of associa-
tion therefore plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.... [However,] [t]he right to associ-
ate for expressive purposes is not ... absolute." Id.
56. Id.; see also infra note 59.
57. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
58. See Note, United States Jaycees v. McClure: Private Organizations and the Right of Asso-
ciation - How Far Does Constitutional Protection Extend?, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1535 (1984).
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constitutional right of an individual to associate exclusively. 9 If an organi-
zation is truly intimate or expressive in nature, a state must demonstrate a
very significant and compelling reason for infringing upon that organiza-
tion's right to associate exclusively. 0 In addition, a state must demonstrate
that the compelling interests have been advanced in the least restrictive
means available to achieve the desired ends.61
III. THE NEW YORK STATE CLUB ASSOCIATION OPINIONS
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice White, writing for the majority in New York State Club Associa-
tion v. City of New York, 62 acknowledged that N.Y.S.C.A. had standing to
challenge the constitutionality of Local Law 63 on behalf of its members.63
However, the majority concluded that N.Y.S.C.A.'s facial challenge of Lo-
cal Law 63 could not prevail.64 The Court noted that in order to prevail on
a facial challenge, N.Y.S.C.A. had to demonstrate either that Local Law 63
59. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628. In Roberts, the Supreme Court ruled that the application of a
state antidiscrimination statute to the Jaycees was constitutional because the statute reflected "the
State's strong historical commitment to eliminating discrimination and... [t]hat goal.., plainly
serves compelling state interests of the highest order." Id. at 624.
60. See Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. at 537; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
(right of free association can be limited by state statutes necessary to serve a compelling interest
unrelated to suppression of ideas).
At this point it is interesting to note the position taken by Justice O'Connor in her concurring
opinion in Roberts. Justice O'Connor argued that all organizations should be classified as either
commercial or expressive. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 634-35 (O'Cbnnor, J., concurring). Commercial
organizations would be granted only minimal constitutional protection, while expressive organiza-
tions would be afforded full constitutional protection under the first amendment. Id. However, as
Justice O'Connor recognized, "[d]etermining whether an association's activity is predominantly
protected expression will often be difficult, if only because a broad range of activities can be ex-
pressive." Id. at 636; see also supra note 57; Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 82 MICH. L. Rnv. 1878, 1894 (1984).
61. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
62. - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
63. Id. at 2231. The Supreme Court held that:
[Ain association has standing to sue on behalf of its members "when (a) its members would
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are
germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit."
Id. at 2232 (quoting Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343
(1977)).
The Court rejected the City's interpretation of Hunt. The majority held that N.Y.S.C.A. had
standing to sue on behalf of its members as long as those members had standing to challenge Local
Law 63 individually. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2232; see also J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 57 (3d ed. 1986).
64. New York State Club Ass'n, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2233.
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could never be constitutionally applied to its members or that the Law was
substantially overbroad.65
The Court first determined that Local Law 63 could be validly applied
to N.Y.S.C.A. members.6 6 The majority reached this conclusion by analyz-
ing the intimate67 and expressive68 natures of N.Y.S.C.A.'s members. The
Court retained the standards that it had used in earlier decisions 69 to define
intimate7' and expressive7 associations and applied them to N.Y.S.C.A..
The majority found that most N.Y.S.C.A. members were neither intimate72
nor expressive, 73 but rather commercial in nature. 74 The Court acknowl-
edged that a few N.Y.S.C.A. members may have been intimate75 or expres-
65. Id. The Supreme Court noted that N.Y.S.C.A. had brought suit contesting the constitu-
tionality of Local Law 63 prior to the initiation of enforcement proceedings against any of its
members. Id. The Court stated that in order for N.Y.S.C.A. to prevail on a facial attack the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the challenged law either "could never be applied in a valid man-
ner" or that even though it may be validly applied to the plaintiff and others, it nevertheless is so
broad that it "may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third parties."
Id. (quoting City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798 (1984)).
66. Id. at 2233-34.
67. Id. at 2233. The majority compared the size of N.Y.S.C.A.'s members to the size of the
local chapter of the Jaycees reviewed in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
The Court noted that the two associations were comparable in size and that the Jaycees had not
been constitutionally protected private associations. Also, the majority noted that many of the
clubs found not to be constitutionally protected intimate associations in Board of Directors of
Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987), were smaller than many of
N.Y.S.C.A.'s members. New York State Club Ass'n, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2233.
In addition, the majority noted that the associations covered by Local Law 63 provide regular
food service and collect regular payments for services from non-members. The Court stated that:
"These characteristics are at least as significant in defining the nonprivate nature of these associa-
tions, because of the kind of role that strangers play in their ordinary existence, as is the regular
participation of strangers at meetings, which we emphasized in Roberts and Rotary." Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
68. Id. at 2234. The Court noted that combining with others to further one's views was an
important means of guaranteeing the security of those activities enumerated in the first amend-
ment. Thus, Local Law 63 does not infringe upon an organization's expressive associational
rights because "[o]n its face, Local Law 63 does not affect 'in any significant way' the ability of
individuals to form associations that will advocate public or private viewpoints." Id. (citing Ro-
tary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. at 548).
69. Id. at 2233-34; see also Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620-22; Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. at
546-47.
70. New York State Club Ass'n, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2233; see also supra notes 41-44
and accompanying text.
71. New York State Club Ass'n, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2234; see also supra note 51 and
accompanying text.
72. New York State Club Ass'n, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2233; see also supra note 67.
73. New York State Club Ass'n, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2234; see also supra note 68.
74. New York State Club Ass'n, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2233; see also supra note 60.
75. New York State Club Ass'n, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2234.
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sive associations76 and therefore were entitled to constitutional protection
under the first amendment." However, the majority ruled that since Local
Law 63 did not infringe upon the associational rights of every N.Y.S.C.A.
member,78 N.Y.S.C.A.'s facial challenge could not prevail on those
grounds.79
The Court then turned to an analysis of N.Y.S.C.A.'s claim that Local
Law 63 was substantially overbroad.8" The majority concluded that the
Law was not overbroad. 8 In so holding, the Court held that the record did
not indicate the characteristics of any club whose associational rights would
be infringed upon by the application of Local Law 63 and, therefore, the
Law could not be overbroad.8" The majority concluded that any overbreath
of Local Law 63 not evident from the record could be cured on a case-by-
case basis83 and did not require the upholding of N.Y.S.C.A.'s facial
challenge.8 4
Finally, the majority undertook an analysis of Local Law 63 with re-
spect to the fourteenth amendment.85 N.Y.S.C.A. asserted that an exemp-
tion in Local Law 63 for benevolent orders and religious corporations8 6 was
a violation of the equal protection clause.8 7 The Court rejected that argu-
76. Id. The Court stated that:
It is conceivable, of course, that an association might be able to show that it is organized
for specific expressive purposes and that it will not be able to advocate its desired view-
points nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its membership to those who share the same
sex, for example, or the same religion.
Id.
77. Id. If an organization is intimate or expressive in nature, its right to freely associate is
guaranteed under the first amendment unless the State exhibits a compelling state interest justify-
ing an infringement upon that right. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
78. New York State Club Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. at 2234. The Court held that Local Law 63 cannot
be deemed "invalid on its face because it infringes the private associational rights of each and
every club covered by it." Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. The majority noted that application of the "overbreadth doctrine" is used infre-
quently and usually as a last resort. Id. (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)).
81. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2235.
82. Id. The Court held that the lack of information on the record regarding the characteris-
tics of participating N.Y.S.C.A. members meant that there could be no determination that "the
Law threatens to undermine the associational or expressive purposes of any club, let alone a sub-
stantial number of them." Id.
83. Id. The Court reasoned that "[t]hese opportunities for individual associations to contest
the constitutionality of the Law as it may be applied against them are adequate to assure that any
overbreadth under the Law will be curable through case-by-case analysis of specific facts." Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.; see also supra note 7.
86. New York State Club Ass'n, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2235; see also supra note 15.
87. New York State Club Ass'n, - U.S at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2235-36. N.Y.S.C.A. asserted that
benevolent orders and religious corporations were "in fact no different in nature from the other
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ment, s holding that New York law indicated that these organizations were
unique and thus a rational basis existed for the City's exemption of those
organizations in Local Law 63.89 In addition, the majority noted that there
was no evidence in the record which would indicate that benevolent orders
and religious corporations were identical to N.Y.S.C.A.'s members in criti-
cal respects. 90 Lacking such evidence, the Court found no basis for the
equal protection claim.91
. The Concurring Opinions
Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Kennedy joined, filed a concur-
ring opinion.92 In concurring, Justice O'Connor emphasized the associa-
tional issues addressed by the majority opinion.93 She reiterated the
importance of an organization's right of free association, as well as a state's
compelling interest in eliminating public discrimination.94  Justice
O'Connor noted that the factors identified in Local Law 63 are not exclu-
sive, but rather are to be considered in addition to those factors enumerated
by the Court in earlier free association cases. 95
Justice Scalia also filed a concurring opinion.96 Justice Scalia noted his
dissatisfaction with the Court's analysis of benevolent orders. 97 He stated
that the fact that benevolent orders are unique does not consequently estab-
clubs and associations that are now made subject to the city's antidiscrimination restrictions." Id.
at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2236. Thus, the exemption of those organizations that were similar to
N.Y.S.C.A.'s members was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. The Court noted examples of various New York laws that recognized benevolent
orders and religious corporations as being unique and treated them in a separate body of legisla-
tion. Id.
90. Id. The majority stated that there was no evidence to indicate that benevolent orders and
religious corporations were "identical in this and other critical respects to the private clubs that
are covered under the City's antidiscrimination provisions." Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2237.
91. Id.
92. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, - U.S. at-, -, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2237
(1988) (O'Connor, J. and Kennedy, J., concurring).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. Justice O'Connor noted that the factors enumerated in Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609,
distinguishing intimate and expressive associations from commercial associations, still prevail.
New York State Club Ass'n, - U.S. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2237. She also noted that those associa-
tions designated as commercial in nature would receive the minimum level of constitutional pro-
tection. Id.; see also supra note 60.
96. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, - U.S. -, -, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2238




lish that the City acted upon a rational basis.9" Rather, there must be a
stronger connection between the orders' uniqueness and the intent of the
law.9 9 However, Justice Scalia was satisfied that those organizations ex-
empted by Local Law 63 were-exempted on a rational basis."°
IV. ANALYSIS
New York State Club Association v. City of New York °1 is, in actuality, a
reiteration of the Supreme Court's prior interpretations of the right of free
association. 1°2 While the Court's decision followed the trend of previous
decisions in the area of free association, the holding highlighted several
problems that have arisen from the Court's analysis of private and commer-
cial associations.10 3
A state's interest in eliminating discrimination in commercial associa-
tions is indeed compelling."° State legislatures have recognized this need
and have enacted statutes designed to deprive those associations, which are
commercial in nature, of the private club exemption they enjoyed under
public accommodation laws.'° 5 The Court has upheld the constitutionality
of those statutes, recognizing a state's compelling interest in eliminating
discrimination. 106
However, the problem is not with the intent of the Court's decision.
Rather, the problem is with the test that the Court has established to distin-
guish between private and commercial associations. In Roberts v. United
States Jaycees,"°7 the Court noted that the factors used to determine
whether a club is distinctly private in nature included "size, purpose, poli-
cies, selectivity, congeniality, and other characteristics ...."o Also rele-
98. Id.
99. Id. Justice Scalia noted that Local Law 63 was unclear on the factors that made benevo-
lent orders unique. Thus, the rational basis of the City's decision to exempt those organizations
was in question. Id. However, Justice Scalia stated that it appeared as though the Law was
referring to fraternal organizations which, he noted, were not the type of organizations that con-
tributed to the problem of discrimination that the City was attempting to alleviate. Id.
100. Id.
101. - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
102. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
103. See Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987);
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
104. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
105. Id. With the enactment of antidiscrimination statutes, the legislatures have been re-
sponding to pressure from women and minorities who have been entering the business world in
increasing numbers. See Burns, supra note 35.
106. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
107. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
108. Id. at 620.
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vant to a club's distinction as private was the expressive nature of the
club.1" 9 In New York State Club Association, 110 the Court appears to disre-
gard many of these factors and instead focuses on the size of a club as deter-
minative of its private or commercial nature."' The Court focused on the
400-member limitation of Local Law 63, giving only a nod to the other
factors enumerated in previous decisions.
This analysis is problematic because it leaves open the possibility of dis-
tinguishing a private association from a commercial association solely on
the size of its membership list. With the establishment of a 400-member
limit on private clubs, it would not be surprising to see many clubs admit
only 399 members. However, extension of constitutional protection to an
association should not be made on the basis of one member. Rather, it
should be based upon a combination of factors of which size is just one part.
Justice O'Connor alluded to this point in her concurring opinion."
12
She argued that the majority's decision is not a rejection of the criteria that
were used to characterize free association in previous cases." 3 Indeed, the
decision may not be a rejection of the standards adopted in Roberts," 14 but
it appears to be a strong indication that the Court regards certain factors to
be more indicative than others of the private or commercial nature of an
association. The majority recognized size, meal service, and payments to
the club by non-members as being indicative of an association's private or
commercial nature.' One can easily imagine the many ways in which pri-
vate clubs will attempt to structure their activities to maintain their distinc-
tion as private associations." 6
Unfortunately, it appears that this trend may strongly impact upon the
right of free association in the future. The Court's upholding of Local Law
63's constitutionality has alerted other legislatures to the type of antidis-
crimination statutes that will be upheld by the courts. Thus, other statutes
will be enacted which place a primary emphasis on size rather than on a
109. Id. at 622-23.
110. - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2225.
111. Id. at 2233-34.
112. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2237
(1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
113. Id. Justice O'Connor stated that she wrote "separately only to note that nothing in the
Court's opinion in any way undermines or denigrates the importance of any associational interests
at stake." Id.
114. 468 U.S. at 620-21.
115. New York State Club Ass'n, - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. at 2233.
116. It is almost amusing to imagine the infinite number of ways in which an association
could attempt to frustrate a statute like the one present in this case. Limiting membership to 399
people, having meal service on alternate days at varying sites, and requiring that members pay all
club bills are some examples.
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consideration of all of the relevant factors1 17 A solution to the problem
would be an adherence by the Court to the position advocated by Justice
O'Connor.118 If, for example, the Court would look not only at the size of
an association, but also at the association's membership qualifications, poli-
cies, and activities, the designation of an association as private or commer-
cial would be much more comprehensive. Thus, in'stead of focusing on
form, by looking primarily at a club's size, the Court would be focusing on
substance, the actual composition of the club. Unless the Court chooses to
examine these types of factors more closely, the right of free association will
be distinguished by associations that have created an outer "private club"
shell, while inside they remain "commercial organizations." '119
V. CONCLUSION
New York State Club Association v. City of New York 121 presented the
United States Supreme Court with a case that required the Court to address
the right of free association in conjunction with a state advancing a compel-
ling interest. By applying factors that had been previously utilized in right
of free association cases, the Court continued to broaden a state's power to
eliminate discrimination in private clubs. This decision did not present any
new standards to apply to the right of free association, but merely reiterated
the trends emphasized in previous decisions. The majority opinion estab-
lished standards that, in the future, place courts in the position of deciding
cases involving the right of free association based on form, rather than
substance.
SHELLY A. RANUS
117. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620-21.
118. New York Club Ass'n v. City of New York, - U.S.-,-, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2237 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
119. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 631 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring); see also supra note 60.
120. - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988).
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